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Economic and Social Rights (ESRs) are the unloved and unwanted last born child
of the human rights family. Despite a promising start in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (the UDHR), ESRs still retain a second class status in most national
jurisdictions. What explains this cynicism with which ESRs are (still) regarded? This
blogpost analyzes how the skeptical gaze through which ESRs are often viewed
legitimizes (or attempts) to legitimize government failures to provide for those
members of their populace who are in most desperate need, and (unsuccessfully)
masks the self-interest that pervades most of international law.
At the time of the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, no distinction was made between
civil and political rights (CPRs), on the one hand, and ESRs, on the other.
Unfortunately, however, within the so called International Bill of Human Rights,
the content of the UDHR was divided in two separate covenants, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR) and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR). This artificial division
resulted in the creation of a hierarchy that for a large part of the human rights
movement’s life unfairly privileged CPRs at the expense of ESRs. To date, despite
“a degree of optimism generated in recent years” about the interdependence
and invisibility of all human rights, and by the constitutional entrenchment and
subsequent adjudication of ESRs in various national jurisdictions, ESRs have not yet
fully come of age.
While some concerns raised about ESRs may be valid, I argue that this chronic
and sustained rejection of ESRs can in some instances be seen as a manifestation
of the cynicism with which certain governments regard international law generally
and ESRs specifically. Cynicism in this context can be conceptualized as and is
characterized by a general distrust of the motives which accompany state actions
(or inactions as the case may be) within the context of failures to recognize and
implement ESRs. There is more than what meets the eye when states reject ESRs
(whether formally or substantively). These underlying reasons for the rejection of
ESRs, that sometimes have nothing to do with the rights themselves or with their
ability to be implemented, form the foundation of cynicism as understood here.
I would say that cynicism is used as both a sword and a shield in the area of ESRs in
order to accomplish two distinct but interconnected purposes. As a sword, cynicism
forms the foundation of the critiques deployed to object to recognition of ESRs as
real human rights (in comparison to CPRs) and to deny them a seat at the table of
international legal norms that ought to be legally binding. As a shield cynicism is
relied upon in order to allow minimalist implementation of ESRs obligations to defend
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errant states against assertions (whether before national courts or regional and
international treaty bodies ) to the effect that they are failing to meet their obligations
to fully (albeit progressively) realize ESRs. In both instances cynicism highlights a
measure of self-interest on the part of the states in question. Self-interest because
the reasons advanced by the states for failing to respect and implement ESRs are
not always genuine. Rather, they camouflage a range of ulterior motives ranging
from states not wanting to be told how to make resource allocation decisions to
states only ratifying international treaties such as the ICESCR because of political
pressure with no real intention of following through. In these instances self-interest
comes at the expense of full realization of all ESRs as stipulated by the requirements
of article 2(1) of the ICESCR.
Flowing from the above, I analyze Cynicism in the area of ESRs with a two-fold
intention. First, in order to outline how cynical legal arguments have been deployed
against the implementation of ESRs at both the international and national level
in order to relegate these rights to an inferior status in comparison to their CPRs
counterparts, with the consequence that violations of ESRs are not considered to be
“that bad”, and second, to illustrate how even in situations where ESRs are afforded
recognition either through ratification of regional and international treaties, or in
national jurisdictions (sometimes through constitutional entrenchment of said rights)
legal arguments founded on both international and domestic law norms are relied
upon in a cynical manner to allow state parties to justify the circumvention of their
legal obligations under the ICESCR. This skeptical gaze through which ESRs are
often viewed (un)intentionally results in government failures on a national level to
provide for those members of their populace who are in most desperate need.
I propose a tripartite analysis of cynicism in the area of ESRs. Firstly, I undertake
a historical analysis of the ideological, philosophical and legal arguments lobbied
against ESRs in the incipient years of the ICESCR with the intention of illustrating
that most of the common objections raised against the justiciability of ESRs were/
are not insurmountable but rather were/are a manifestation of the cynicism that
plagues certain areas of International Law. For instance, I argue that during the Cold
War there was an intensification of the ideological controversy which pitted socialist
countries against some western societies with the former championing ESRs while
the latter overstated the priority given to CPRs instead. However, these differences
in States’ ideological backgrounds impacted how the states in question received
ESRs and contributed to cynicism in some instances. The rejection of ESRs under
these conditions, therefore, may have had more to do with defending a particular
economic system that the state in question subscribed to, and less to do with the
nature of the rights themselves.
Secondly, I further posit that national and international law norms have been used
cynically by various governments in order to (attempt to) justify current failures to
realize ESRs. For instance, chronic reliance by a number of domestic constitutional
settings such as Ireland on the ‘supremacy of the Constitution’ arguments in order
to forestall the application of international ESRs norms. Furthermore, there is also
cynicism inherent in the wording of the ICESCR itself which has in turn perpetuated
further cynicism in its implementation. International law is perhaps more cynical than
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other areas of law because it is premised on state consent. Consensus is the soft
underbelly of international law. Without it, international law as we know it, would
crumble. In crafting international law rules cynicism manifests itself in international
law’s self-interested attempts to secure states’ compliance with its prescriptions. This
evinces cynicism because the underlying assumption is that states will not observe
the rules of international law because it is just and right to do so, rather they will
do so because they have been coerced into such observance using either a “stick
or a carrot” approach. This cynicism begets cynicism. Thus, in the area of ESRs
the inclusion of the requirement of “progressive realization” in the wording of the
ICESCR deliberately and rather cynically manifests this self-interest by setting the
stage for states to agree to be bound by the covenant by making it (appear to be)
easier to justify non-fulfilment of the obligations under the covenant.
Lastly, and on a more optimistic note, while a certain amount of cynicism is inherent
in the history of ESRs and how they advanced through the ages, a silver lining exists
because recent developments point to less rather than more cynicism in the area
of ESRs in today’s world. As Kathryn Young argues in her latest book, “the future
of ESRs is unlikely to resemble its past”. Despite their initial neglect in the human
rights movement, and avoidance by (some) courts, ESRs are now increasingly at the
top of the human rights agenda. Even more optimistically, Young posits that a rights
revolution appears to be taking place.
While concerns have long been harboured about the tokenistic nature of ESRs and
the cynical tendencies of states to obscure infringement of rights by hiding behind
sham constitutional texts and insincere treaty ratifications, I caution against throwing
the baby out with the bathwater. A certain amount of cynicism will always be a part
of the ESRs story, given how these rights were birthed. However, as ESRs continue
to positively change the lives of millions of rights holders in the world it is apparent
that sometimes more rights mean more victories for right-holders and in turn less
cynicism about rights. We must conquer our own cynicism! Today, the true promise
of ESRs lies as yet unfulfilled. We are lucky enough, at the very least, to live in a
time when there is more rather than less ESRs and (hopefully) less rather than more
cynicism.
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